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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
St. Petersburg train back on track 
Just when the idea of Putin employing another Petersburger seems the "shaggy 
dog" story of Kremlinology — a long-winded metaphor of power without the 
requisite payoff, Putin reaches back into the Neva and pulls out another old 
chum. It seems Yevgeni Lisov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in 
charge of the Monitoring Directorate, a Kremlin veteran from the 1990’s, is 
retiring (at the age of 63) and is being replaced by Valeri Nazarov. Nazarov 
previously headed up the St. Petersburg Municipal Property Management 
Committee and is said to be close to the Kremlin’s First Deputy Head, Dmitri 
Kozak. (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 145 Jan 04; What the Papers Say, Part A via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Lisov, who may well be intent on enjoying a hard-earned retirement, was closely 
linked to the Yel’tsin Family; his departure, in the wake of Voloshin’s, therefore, is 
an anticipated move in the slow, but steady drain of Family friends from the 
Kremlin inner circle. 
 
If Putin possessed a deep attachment for the soil around the Neva, we could 
expect a developing row among the Petersburgers as they vie to claim the purest 
northern spirit, but the Petersburg connection is obviously one of political and 
security services contacts soldered in the upheavals of the Gorbachev and early 
Yel’tsin years. As siloviki and Petersburgers swell the ranks of the Moscow 
political elite, a new test of loyalty will surely emerge. Just what it might be is the 
interesting puzzle. 
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Looking for a campaign issue? 
There’s nothing quite like rooting out corruption in the state bureaucracy to give a 
healthy boost to popularity. With a Presidential campaign hovering on the 
horizon, President Putin announced the creation of an anti-corruption council, 
which will occupy both the Government and the Kremlin apparat as they struggle 
with a familiar bugaboo. 
 
At the first sitting of the Council, which consists of representatives of the Cabinet, 
Duma, Federation Council, as well as the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, 
President Putin outlined his proposed structure both for the Council and its work; 
two commissions will be established: one, led by Deputy Prime Minister Boris 
Alyoshin, will focus on "countering corruption" in general (theoretically at a 
macro-level, involving the taxation and judicial systems); while the other will deal 
primarily with issues of concern to state officials, such as their salaries, rights and 
duties. The second commission will be headed by Dmitri Kozak. (Vedomosti, No. 
2; RusDataLine-Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
There are some obvious mixed messages seeping from the meeting. Kozak, who 
has led the Kremlin charge in Judicial reform, spoke immediately to the need for 
further reform, although his anti-corruption council bailiwick presumably would 
not involve this aspect. While some speculate that the work of the commission 
will be to coordinate the drafting and passing of anti-corruption legislation, the big 
money is on the favorite: it will be another in a long line of "consultative" bodies. 
 
Dated Dean, married Kerry 
On the American presidential campaign trail, a new phrase has cropped up to 
explain the rapid deflation of Governor Howard Dean’s poll numbers and the 
surge for Senator John Kerry in the Iowa Caucasus: "Dated Dean, married 
Kerry." 
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The Russian phrase to cover a similar political expediency is equally elegant: A 
betrothal is not yet a marriage. Many a political candidate has learned this in the 
aftermath of the parliamentary campaign, and many may yet learn it again after 
the presidential campaign. If the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky before the fall 
elections did not convince the "reformist" camp that Putin did not wish to share 
their democratic credentials, perhaps they will continue to harbor the delusion 
that Putin really wants to proceed down a more liberal, open aisle in the lead-up 
to the Presidential poll. Following the parliamentary elections, Putin made a 
series of overt gestures to the Russian political right wing — seeming to offer 
both jobs and other opportunities. In that spirit, while remnants of the Yel’tsin 
Family are ousted from their Kremlin positions, a few holdovers, namely Gleb 
Pavlovsky and Vladimir Surkov, struggle to convince skeptical voters that Putin is 
a dashingly democratic bridegroom. (Kontinent, 26 Dec 03; What the papers Say 
via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Obviously, some party leaders, still unable to put aside their personal differences 
and field an persuasive opposition candidate, may delude themselves with the 
notion that Putin can still be handled by the Family and guided down an 
authoritarian, but still democratic path. They’ve left a lot riding on Putin’s 
engagement. 
 
There goes "democracy for bureaucracy" 
Putin’s view on economics seems to "trickle down" this way: Privatization led to 
grotesque profits for a few individuals with little compensatory benefit to the state 
or the vast majority of Russian citizens. The tax system therefore, needs to be 
overhauled to ensure that the state reaps more of the benefit — not so much a 
renationalization as a redistribution. Previously, private individuals fought dirty, 
kompromat (and even violent) wars to control Russia’s assets, destroying or 
bribing (whichever worked) individual apparatchiki, legislators, ministers, or 
committees as necessary. These heady days of "democracy (or kleptocracy) for 
bureaucracy" are over. 
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Putin has an economic vision of a revised tax code designed to split oil profits 
more favorably between the owners and the state's writ large. Rather than 
allowing individual bureaucrats to profit through the corruption of the system, the 
Putin regime intends, in fact, to steer the major oil players along the Gazprom 
route: put apparatchiki on the board of directors and make certain that the 
company tithes to the state. (Prime-Tass, 13 Jan 04 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Some imagine that a tax policy that enforces stringent ‘coziness’ between private 
owners and state structures is that slip on the slope of fascism and the 
"dictatorship of national capital." (Ibid.) Perhaps it’s just another step along the 
path of "controllable democracy" first set out by President Yel’tsin, in which the 
government was cast in the starring role in both the path to the market and the 
transition to democracy. In any event, it serves as another reminder that 
democracy is a fragile, maddening system, often easier to circumvent than to 
trust. Rather than develop the term democracy into a fetish, we could spend 
more productive effort defining its parameters. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
More evidence of FSB complicity 
On 12 January, the Moscow Municipal Court convicted two men, Adam 
Dekkushev and Yusuf Krymshamkhalov on multiple indictments relating to their 
alleged direct involvement in the 1999 Moscow and Volgodonsk apartment 
bombings, in which 243 persons were killed. The two men were not only 
convicted of terrorism and murder, but guilty verdicts were also handed down for 
charges of illegal entry into Russia, membership in illegal organizations, and the 
illegal production, storage and use of explosives. Both defendants were 
sentenced to life imprisonment, and were ordered by the court to pay 4.8 million 
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Rubles ($140,000) in damages to the families of the victims. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 13 January 2004, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The FSB and the 
Russian Prosecutor have pronounced themselves satisfied with the verdicts, and 
with the investigation leading to the convictions. FSB spokesman, Sergei 
Ignatchenko, however, has noted that the alleged mastermind of the attack, 
Achimez Gachiyayev is still at large, and that the case cannot be fully closed until 
he is captured. (BBC MONITORING, 12 January 2004, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Gachiyayev is believed to have been initially sponsored by Khattab, 
who was killed prior to the bombings. (WPS-DEFENCE and SECURITY, 5 May 
03, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The arrest and conviction of Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov, and events 
surrounding and directly relating to the trial deepen the suspicions voiced by 
some that the FSB was directly complicit in the bombings, which provided Putin 
with a convenient excuse to launch the current Chechen war. Furthermore, these 
same events add to concerns that President Putin, through the FSB, is returning 
Russia to the status of a police state. 
 
The investigation of the bombings that led to the conviction of Dekkushev and 
Krymshamkhalov were began in late 1999. This inquiry, led by the FSB and the 
Prosecutor's office, established that Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov fled to 
Pankisi Gorge in Georgia immediately after the attacks. It was from there that the 
two were extradited and returned to Moscow for trial in 2002. In April 2003, the 
Prosecutor’s office announced that the investigation was complete and that a trial 
would begin late in October. It is the events of early October in particular that are 
extremely suspicious. 
 
Mikhail Trepashkin was to have been the lawyer representing one of the victims’ 
families in the courtroom. For ten years before entering the legal profession, 
Trepashkin served as an intelligence officer in the FSB. During the summer of 
2002, Trepashkin was tasked with leading an independent investigation into the 
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bombings for State Duma Deputies and Kovalev Commission members Yuli 
Rybakov, Sergei Yushenko, Sergei Kovalyov and Yuri Shchekochikhin. (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 14 Jan 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) According to 
Nikolai Gorokhov, Trepashkin’s assistant, it was during his investigation that 
Trepashkin’s suspicions over the FSB’s involvement were first aroused. He 
planned at the trial of Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov, to bring his evidence to 
the judges’ attention. (Ibid.) 
 
On October 22 however, a week before the trial was due to open, Trepashkin 
was stopped by the police and arrested. After being held for several weeks, he 
was transferred on December 15 to Matrosskaya Tishina Prison, where he is 
awaiting trial on the charge of divulging state secrets. According to his lawyer, 
the FSB claims that a search of Trepashkin’s home yielded 30 classified 
documents from his time as an FSB officer. (Ibid) According to Aleksandr 
Goldfarb of the Civil Liberties Foundation in New York, Trepashkin has suffered 
torture at the hands of his FSB jailers, including food, sleep and water 
deprivation, being handcuffed in stress positions, and being incarcerated in sub-
zero temperatures. (INFO PROD-Strategic Business Information, 29 Dec 03, via 
RFE/RL, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In the same interview, Goldfarb 
added that he believed that Trepashkin had been arrested because he "too 
deeply investigated the explosions of the apartment buildings in Moscow and 
Volgodonsk in 1999." (Ibid.) Trepashkin’s replacement was not permitted to study 
his files; thus, the evidence was not presented during the trial. Is it mere 
coincidence that, on top of Trepashkin’s arrest, several members of the Duma 
Commission were killed in 2003? Yushenko was murdered near his home in April 
2003, while Shchekochikhin died from an apparent case of food poisoning later in 
the year. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 14 Jan 03, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
This is not the first time that allegations have been made about the FSB’s 
complicity. Exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky and his ally, FSB Defector 
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Aleksandr Litvinenko have repeatedly claimed that the FSB planted the 1999 
bombs. Indeed, Litvinenko recently published a book detailing his allegations, 
titled "FSB Blows up Russia". Both have spoken about the trial and the 
convictions. Berezovsky has stated that the trial was a "show" (BBC 
MONITORING 12 Jan 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database), while Litvinenko 
claimed that Trepashkin’s arrest proved the FSB’s involvement. (BBC 
MONITORING, 31 Dec 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Yet, even if their 
allegations are true, Berezovsky is tainted by his personal battle with Putin, as 
well as his alleged former dealings with Chechen terrorists. By extension, 
therefore, Litvinenko, because of his closeness to Berezovsky, is also tainted. 
 
So far at least, there is no evidence to suggest that Trepashkin has ties to 
Berezovsky, and as such, his evidence need not be viewed through that 
particular prism. Trepashkin, without doubt showed great courage in his decision 
to remain in Russia, in order to try to bring to light what now must surely be seen 
as criminal actions by government agencies. His incarceration provides 
compelling evidence that the FSB was concerned enough to prevent him from 
making his case. 
 
Finally, in a related anti-terror operation, the FSB has begun to seize copies of 
Litvinenko’s book claiming that it constitutes "anti-government propaganda". 
(BBC NEWS, 30 Dec 03; www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/33757705.htm) 
The confiscation occurred on 29 December, when a truck was stopped en-route 
to Moscow from Pskov, with 4,400 copies on board. (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 30 Dec 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The news agency 
which ordered the books, Prima, has stated that there was nothing illegal about 
the shipment, and that all "customs formalities" had been properly observed. 
(Ibid) As yet, there have been no other reported incidents of Litvinenko’s book 
being seized: But the fact that this has occurred at all, marks yet another 
example of Putin’s tendency to authoritarianism. It is the first time that this has 
occurred in almost 12 years, and according to an unnamed human rights activist 
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interviewed on Ekho Moscow Radio on 13 January, it marks a return to the 
darker aspects of Soviet rule. (BBC MONITORING, 13 January 04, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) At this point in time, it seems difficult to disagree 
with this conclusion. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Japan wants peace, Russia talks fish 
Moscow refuses to take more than baby steps in its relationship with Tokyo. 
Although common interests and current diplomatic, economic and security 
conditions may be presenting the best chance yet to conclude the unresolved 
issues of World War II between Russia and Japan, (ASIA TIMES, 15 Dec 03 via 
Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #7469, 16 Dec 03) the Kremlin seems unwilling 
seriously to engage in the topic. Moreover, an opportunity to partner with Japan 
in order to counterbalance Chinese power in Asia does not yet appear to be part 
of Moscow's strategy. A phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
and his Japanese counterpart Yoriko Kawaguchi in November 2003, in which 
Ivanov reportedly invited Kawaguchi to Moscow to discuss the Kurile Islands 
issue, sparked hope in Japan that the visits of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasianov in December 2003 and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the spring 
of 2004 to Tokyo would provide the venues for a peace treaty or at least some 
mutually acceptable agreement on control of the Kurile Islands. But Kasianov's 
15-17 December stay in Japan provided no such occasion. 
 
The visit, which marked Kasianov's first to Japan as prime minister and the first 
of any Russian prime minister in the past five years, was promoted as primarily 
devoted to economic issues. Tokyo again called on Russia to build the oil 
pipeline to Nakhodka for which oil-hungry Japan has been pushing, but Kasianov 
deflated any expectations of a peace treaty or pipeline decision when he 
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announced that his trip would not untie any knots. (RIA, 15 Dec 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Rather, Kasianov proclaimed the 
fight against illegal seafood fishing is one of the most important topics for 
discussion, during his visit to Japan. (ITAR-TASS, 15 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Kasianov consoled the Japanese by explaining that the Angarsk-Nakhodka 
pipeline was not an alternative to the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline [the pipeline 
project desired by Beijing], but rather was an impetus to develop the resources of 
Eastern Siberia. (ITAR-TASS, 15 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Following his trip, the prime minister explained to journalists 
that significant foreign investment was necessary to expedite the development of 
the Eastern Siberian oilfields designated for the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline 
(ITAR-TASS, 25 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) a 
hint that Russia may be waiting for such foreign investment before committing to 
the Nakhodka pipeline project. 
 
Despite the incremental progress in the peace treaty and pipeline issues, the 
Russo-Japanese economic relationship remains strong and was given a boost 
during Kasnianov's visit through a joint automobile venture paving the way for the 
manufacture of Japanese cars in Russia, the creation of a bilateral body to 
promote trade, the discussions of a joint venture for the production of a new kind 
of fuel which is an improvement on condensed gas, (RIA, 15 Dec 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) and an agreement on bilateral 
steps to combat illegal seafood fishing. Japan immediately took action in 
accordance with the seafood agreement when, for the first time ever, on 25 
December, it expelled a Russian fishing vessel with suspicious documents from a 
Japanese port. (ITAR-TASS, 25 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
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Kasianov left Japan with words that may keep Japan's hopes alive for an 
eventual peace treaty and for the realization of the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline 
as he agreed with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the importance 
of [the] Japanese-proposed pipeline and also agreed to accelerate efforts for a 
bilateral peace treaty in line with an action plan signed by Koizumi and [Putin] in 
January [2003]. (KYODO, 16 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
On 3 January, the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced that talks between 
Moscow and Tokyo over the Kurile Islands would be held in the Russian capital 
in February 2004 at the director-general level. (KYODO, 3 Jan 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Russian media made no mention 
of any such talks, which, if they do materialize, may serve as a precursor to 
Putin's planned spring 2004 visit to Japan. It remains to be seen, however, if that 
scheduled post-presidential election trip will be more fruitful for Japan than past 
engagements or if the historical significance to Moscow of the Kurile Islands 
(together with Kaliningrad, Russia's last remaining acquisition from World War II) 
and its unwillingness to compromise its position vis-à-vis Japan outweigh the 
practical benefits of advancing the Tokyo-Moscow relationship. 
 
Russian foreign minister in South America 
Throughout 2003, Russia tried to remain a key player in global affairs by 
extending the reach of its influence through participation in regional organizations 
such as the creation of the Single Economic Space, expressing interest in 
signing onto the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and making a bid to join the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). The year ended on a similar note with Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov's attendance as special guest at a December summit of Mercosur, the 
South American regional organization which comprises Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, and has Bolivia, Chile and Peru as associate members. 
His attendance at that summit in Montevideo, Uruguay was part of an 11-day trip 
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to Latin America during which he also visited Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela 
and Cuba. 
 
The unspectacular substance of his meetings with his hosts comprised 
discussions of increased trade cooperation in the fields of space research, oil 
and gas, agriculture and others. The visit, however, was also an exchange of 
support as Ivanov extended Moscow's backing to Brazil as a potential permanent 
member of a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (GAZETA 
MERCANTIL, 22 Dec 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Databases) and sought out 
allies among the visited countries by comparing positions on the situation in Iraq, 
the need to restructure the UNSC, and the fight against terrorism. 
 
Ivanov explained Russia's intentions in Latin America in an interview with El 
Mercurio: "Latin America is no longer an arena for competition between Russia 
and the USA, as it was in 'cold war' years. Unlike Soviet times, when cooperation 
was built sometimes on an ideological basis, Russia is now acting strictly on the 
economic basis [sic]." (14 Dec 04 via RIA, 14 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Indeed, although Russia's trade turnover with Latin 
America totals only four percent of Russian foreign trade, Moscow, evidently, 
does have hopes of an improved economic relationship there, as demonstrated 
by the recent creation of bilateral trade commissions between Russia and 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile and by Ivanov's sales pitch during his visit on behalf 
of various Russian industrial sectors. Additionally, his discussions in Venezuela 
resulted in the announcement that Venezuelan owned oil company PDVSA will 
sell its 50% share of Ruhr Oil Refinery in Germany to the Russian Alfa Group 
(BUSINESS NEWS AMERICAS, 24 Dec 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
However, clearly Moscow's economic activities are only the practical and more 
visible side of its interests in Latin America. Less tangible is Russia's desire to 
regain global power status, illustrated by its attempts to extend its influence 
worldwide through bilateral and regional relations. With the United States (U.S.) 
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preoccupied in Iraq and in the war on terrorism in general, and considering the 
current diminished level of Western loyalty to Washington, Ivanov's visit to Latin 
America, traditionally the domain of U.S. economic and political leadership, has 
seized upon an opportunity to make trade and foreign relations inroads there. 
 
Success according to Moscow 
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has patted itself on the back for its 
2003 accomplishments. Not surprisingly, Moscow has taken credit (sometimes 
justifiably, sometimes less so) for some key international events of the past year. 
Following is an abridged version of Russia's most important foreign policy events 
of 2003 as listed by MFA spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenk in an interview last 
month. (RIA NOVOSTI, 27 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
1. "…UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511 were adopted, providing a 
way out of the very acute Iraqi crisis and at the same restoring the unity of the 
international community." 
 
2. "Russia (…) [helped] avoid the erosion of the nonproliferation regime and 
[reduced] tension surrounding the issue of transparency for Iran's and North 
Korea's nuclear programs." "It was precisely in Moscow that a representative of 
the senior Iranian leadership announced that it would fulfill the demands of the 
International Atomic Energy agency." 
 
3. "New steps were taken to develop CIS integration, [including] the signing of 
the agreement on a single economic space incorporating Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan [and the establishment of] an international regional 
body, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)…." 
 
4. "A peaceful settlement of the acute political crisis in Georgia [was reached]." 
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5. "The adoption of UN Security Resolution 1815, which unanimously supported 
the "road map" to a Middle East settlement…." 
 
6. "Participation in the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC) summit….." 
 
7. "The decisions made at the Russia-E.U. summits in St. Petersburg and Rome 
enabled [Russia] to raise the level of its strategic partnership with the European 
Union." 
 
8. "[The] lifting of visa barriers between Russia and the E.U. [have produced their 
first visible results]. [Agreements on simplifying travel procedures… have been 
reached with Germany, France and Italy." 
 
9. "A mechanism has been developed to simplify travel for Russian citizens to 
and from Kaliningrad Region via Lithuania." 
 
10. "[A] council of heads of entities of the [Russian] Federation was established 
under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry". 
 
11. "At Russia's initiative, the 'human rights and terrorism' resolution…was 
adopted at the 58th session of the UN General Assembly." 
 
Mr. Yakovenko is entitled to his view of Russia's successes, but so is the rest of 
the world. Taking credit for providing a way out of the acute Iraqi crisis and 
restoring the unity of the international community overlooks the fact that Moscow 
was in favor of allowing the Iraqi crisis to continue, with Saddam Hussein at the 
helm, and that its alliance with "old Europe" during the pre-war debate 
exacerbated the very split in the international community that Yakovenko is 
crediting Moscow with alleviating. In time, the Kremlin's deeper involvement in 
and support of Saddam's regime may be revealed, as indicated by reports that 
American authorities have corroborated illegal arms sales to Iraq prior to the war. 
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(LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10 Jan 04 via JRL #8008, 10 Jan 04) Moreover, 
although Moscow's contributions to establishing the six-party dialogue with North 
Korea are evident, it is more difficult to accept the view that its cooperation with 
Iran, which enabled Tehran to have a nuclear program in the first place, created 
the transparency necessary to ease the tensions of that crisis. 
 
Yakovenko presents rather flimsy evidence of Russia's Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) integration success; the Single Economic Space (SES) 
is unlikely to develop into a successful, European Union- (E.U.) type organization 
any time soon, and it is even more difficult to imagine the CSTO operating as an 
effective, united and organized military alliance. More prominent CIS events in 
2003 were Moscow's fallout with Minsk over the Kremlin's discontinuing 
Gazprom's subsidized gas prices for Belarus, Russia's continuing delays in the 
withdrawal of forces from Transdniester, and a narrowly averted military conflict 
with Ukraine over the Kerch Strait affair. 
 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's claim to have contributed to resolving the 
revolution in Georgia was acceptable, but Moscow has not yet played all its cards 
in that game. In Malaysia, President Vladimir Putin's attendance at the OIC 
summit in October, though no doubt beneficial to Moscow's desire to bond with 
the Muslim world, proceeded rather awkwardly as Putin's host, Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohammed of Malaysia, proclaimed to the summits audience and the 
world, that Jews rule the world by proxy. (BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION 
ONLINE, news.bbc.co.uk, 21 Oct 03) 
 
Moscow's achievement of lifting visa barriers between Russia and certain E.U. 
countries was indeed a success, but not because it helped to unite Russia and 
the E.U., rather because these bilateral arrangements help to split the E.U. and 
create for Russia the ability to have non-uniform standards for its relationships 
with different E.U. member states. 
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It was kind of Yakovenko to spell out the MFA's success stories of 2003, 
however, foreign affairs analysts would have been more grateful for his vision of 
2004. No doubt, a candid version of a list of such predictions for the new year 
would include: Reform of the United Nations Security Council, further integration 
of the Russia's near-abroad including departure of U.S. forces from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, membership in the World Trade Organization 
without compliance with the E.U.'s demands for lowered energy rates, and a 
quick hand-over of power in Iraq from the U.S.-led coalition to the Iraqi 
authorities, so that Russia can get back in business there. Even without the 
benefit of a list from the MFA, such goals are likely to be evident in Moscow's 
international activities over the next 12 months. 
 
Moscow watches for signs from Tblisi 
The direction that the new Georgian leadership takes in its relationship to Russia 
is of concern for Moscow, which has done what it could to nudge the fledgling 
administration in Tblisi toward a more pro-Russian policy. Following the 
November 2003 revolution in Georgia and the overthrow of President Eduard 
Shevardnadze, there was little real competition for the presidency; despite 
reports that Moscow may have considered supporting the former Georgian KGB-
chief, Igor Georgadze, the election of U.S.-schooled lawyer and opposition leader 
Mikhail Saakashvili was something of a fait accompli. Moscow's approach thus 
became one of taking measures to influence the incoming president's attitude 
toward Russia without arousing suspicion from the West. 
 
The Kremlin first angered Tblisi by inviting representatives of Georgia's two 
secessionist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and of separatist Adjaria to 
Moscow, and then by announcing a simplified visa regime for the residents of 
Adjaria. The latter step, Adjarian officials countered, should not be seen as 
threatening to Georgia, but rather as a sign of what could be between Russia and 
Georgia as a whole. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
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Another message came from one of Moscow's most notorious "pro-integration" 
statesmen, Yevgeni Primakov, who reminded Georgians: If the new Georgian 
leaders changed the balance in favor of the West, [thereby] diminishing the 
relationship with Russia, in his view, Russia would not continue to support these 
new leaders, and they should remember that it is not the USA that supplies 
electricity and gas to Georgia [to heat their homes]. (RIA, 9 Dec 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The military factor was reiterated in a Nezavisimaya gazeta article which argued 
the implausibility of Georgian military action against the secessionist regions 
considering the Russian military presence, the strength of the regions' own 
militias and the deplorable state of the Georgian armed forces. (8 Dec 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Russian Duma Deputy Andrei 
Kokoshin stated in a TV interview that it would be logistically and financially 
impossible to withdraw Russian forces from Georgia anytime earlier than the 
already announced ten years. Moreover, he stated, the Russian bases provide 
work for a significant number of Georgian citizens and, if the withdrawal of troops 
and hardware were sped up, this would leave such persons without a livelihood. 
(CHANNEL ONE TV, 9 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via JRL #8008, 10 Jan 04) I'm 
sure most Georgians are thrilled to know the Russian Duma has such concern 
for them. 
 
Now that the election is over, Moscow appears to be watching for signs of 
Georgia's first move. Thus far, the statements of the new Georgian president, 
though not overtly negative toward Russia, are unclear at best. President 
Saakashvili insists that one of (emphasis added) the main priorities of Georgia's 
new leadership is to establish much closer, warmer, and friendlier relations with 
the Russian Federation (RADIO MAYAK, 5 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database), and that the new Georgian authorities are taking 
"neither a pro-American nor a pro-Russian stance". At the same time, he said, 
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the Russians do not understand well enough that Russia is not an overlord and 
we are not colonies". (RIA NOVOSTI, 7 Jan 04 via JRL #8005, 8 Jan 04) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
LEGISLATURE 
It’s our ball and you can’t play 
In a remarkable display of democratic brotherhood (or, maybe not), the head of 
the central executive committee of United Russia—which obtained enough seats 
in the December 2003 Duma elections to hold an absolute majority, and even to 
pass constitutional changes—is unwilling to build a consensus with his fellow 
parliamentary members, or, for that matter, the millions of Russian voters (well 
over 60%) who did not vote for United Russia. According to Yuri Volkov, he 
doesn’t have to. In fact, he barely acknowledges the existence of much 
competition. 
 
"At present, there are two parties in Russia: one is the [Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation, KPRF], a moribund party, and the other one is ours, which is 
gaining power. The Rodina bloc captured enough votes and we are certainly 
ready for constructive cooperation with them. As for that bloc's destructive 
initiatives, our party is ready to fight them. From my point of view, the Rodina 
bloc is a PR bubble project hyped in the past three weeks. In fact, Rodina, the 
SPS (Union of Right-Wing Forces), and Yabloko are television projects," he said. 
(Rossiyskaya gazeta in Russian 18 Dec 03 p. 3; FBIS-SOV-2003-1219 via World 
News Connection.) So there. 
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Fortunately for the other deputies elected to parliament, Volkov won’t be in 
charge of the roll call. In fact, four factions were registered at the first session of 
the new Duma at the close of 2003: United Russia (304 members, led by Boris 
Gryzlov), the KPRF (52 members, led by Gennady Zyuganov), the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) (36 members, led–officially–by Igor Lebedev 
and unofficially by his father, Vladimir Zhirinovsky), and Motherland (Rodina) (36 
members, led by Sergey Glazyev). In addition, there are 22 "independent" MPs. 
(ITAR-TASS in Russian 1227 GMT 29 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1229 via World 
News Connection.) The number of members in the United Russia faction 
continued to grow after the election, and now includes some independent 
deputies. (ITAR-TASS 1651 GMT 26 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1226 via World 
News Connection.) 
 
Aside from the smug joy in the United Russia camp, the reaction to the election 
results has been mixed. The Communist Party and YABLOKO–parties that 
expected a much better showing than published by the Central Election 
Commission–each sought to lodge complaints. (Vedomosti, 11 Dec 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1212 via World News Connection.) These parties were not alone in 
their dissatisfaction. While the OSCE condemned the process almost 
immediately after the polls closed (See The NIS Observed, 10 Dec 03), others 
waited a little while. Eventually however, over 300 complaints were filed, mostly 
by district electoral commissions, particularly in Bashkortostan, Karachai-
Cherkessia, Krasnodar Territory, Astrakhan Region and Moscow, according to 
Central Electoral Commission secretary Olga Zastrozhnaya. (ITAR-TASS in 
Russian 0954 GMT 19 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1219 via World News 
Connection.) And while Zastrozhnaya’s boss, CEC Chairman Aleksandr 
Veshnyakov, validated the results of the election, he did note the "the violation of 
the principles of objectivity in presenting information in (…) the state mass media 
sources." (ITAR-TASS in Russian 1021 GMT 26 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1226 
via World News Connection.) He did not, however, mention any penalty for that 
behavior, so any improvement is unlikely. 
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As for the future of the parties who failed to overcome the five-percent hurdle to 
obtain seats via party lists, YABLOKO leader Grigori Yavlinsky asserts that 
preserving the party (with himself at the head) is the priority now, and that 
YABLOKO will remain an opposition party outside parliament. (ITAR-TASS in 
English 1640 GMT 9 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1209 via World News 
Connection.) A party congress held after the election confirmed that agenda; 
members refused to vote out Yavlinsky as leader of the now-marginalized party. 
(ITAR-TASS in English 2131 GMT 20 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1220 via World 
News Connection.) 
 
Not so comfortable in the driver’s seat are the three leaders of another party that 
did quite poorly, the Union of Right Forces (SPS). Boris Nemtsov said a new 
democratic party should rise out of the ashes of the SPS and YABLOKO 
debacle. Nemtsov and his colleagues at the helm of SPS–Irina Khakamada and 
Yegor Gaidar–already have submitted their resignations from the top posts. 
"[This] resignation is not a simple gesture, it is an invitation addressed to new 
people to join us," Nemtsov said. "We need restructuring. Without it we shall 
have no future," he said. (ITAR-TASS in English 1514 GMT 16 Dec 03 FBIS-
SOV-2003-1216 via World News Connection.) Members will decide whether to 
accept the resignations at a party congress later this month. 
 
Yet Russia’s politicians have little time to dwell on the parliamentary elections 
that are now part of history. Rather, most are turning their attention to the next 
race–the presidential elections set for March 2004. Nemtsov said he hopes the 
democratic forces will join and select a single candidate (Ibid.) — however, such 
a consensus has managed to elude the two democratic parties for years, and 
continues to do so. Discussions between the two parties broke down, once 
again, in December. (FBIS Report in Russian 23 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1223 
via World News Connection) 
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In all, eight candidates willing to face Vladimir Putin have been registered thus 
far: Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov, who repeatedly has asserted 
his support of the president (Rossiyskaya gazeta in Russian 31 Dec 03 p. 3; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-0102 via World News Connection.) and likely is the designated 
sacrificial lamb meant to give the elections the flavor of democracy; Ivan Rybkin, 
a self-nominated candidate (the justice ministry refused to register his branch of 
the Liberal Democrats party for the parliamentary elections); Oleg Malyshkin, a 
Duma member, described as the "LDPR leader's first deputy and head of his 
guard" (ITAR-TASS in English 1229 GMT 30 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1230 via 
World News Connection); three other self-nominated candidates–Irina 
Khakamada representing SPS, Sergei Glazyev of Rodina, and an unaffiliated 
businessman, Anzori Aksentyev — as well as Nikolai Kharitonov, nominated by 
the Communist Party, and Viktor Geraschenko, nominated by the Russians 
Regions party. (ITAR-TASS in English 1756 GMT 5 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-
0105 via World News Connection.) 
 
It is doubtful that they will make any headway against the man who is bound to 
retain his seat as head of state; Vladimir Putin once again has asserted that he 
will not represent any political party in the election, but will run on his own. (ITAR-
TASS in English 1219 GMT 18 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1218 via World News 
Connection.) Then again, with the state-owned media and apparat behind you, 
who also needs a party? 
 
JUDICIARY 
Politics can be murder 
Two notable assassinations are back in the headlines, as suspects head to trial 
for the murders of Galina Starovoitova and Sergei Yushenkov. In each case, 
prosecutors are, at the very least, hinting that the motives behind the killings 
were political. 
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Six defendants were taken to court at the end of December to stand trial for the 
murder of Yushenkov, an MP and co-chairman of the registered faction of the 
Liberal Russia party, who was shot on 17 April 2003 outside his Moscow home. 
The defendants, headed by Mikhail Kodanev, a leading member of Liberal 
Russia splinter group that remains loyal to oligarch-in-exile Boris Berezovsky, 
include Kodanev’s assistant, Alexander Vinnik, (ITAR-TASS in English 1136 
GMT 26 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1226 via World News Connection.) Aleksandr 
Kulachinskiy, and his accomplices, Igor Kiselev, Anton Drozd and Vladislav 
Palkov. All have been charged with murder, attempt on the life of a state or public 
figure and illegal acquisition of weapons. (ITAR-TASS news agency, in Russian 
0943 GMT 26 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring International Reports, 26Dec 03, via 
Lexis-Nexis) Prosecutors have alleged that the splintering of the party was at the 
core of the murder. (The NIS Observed, 9 Jul 03) Jury selection is expected to 
begin on 26 January. 
 
The same number of defendants currently are charged in the murder of 
Starovoitova, a pro-democracy MP who was shot in the doorway of her 
apartment building in St. Petersburg in November 1998. Federal Security Service 
(FSB) investigators have charged four individuals with playing a direct role in the 
murder, and two with abetting the crime. Other suspects are being sought. 
(ITAR-TASS in English 1408 GMT 5 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0105 via World 
News Connection) Prosecutors have identified Vitali Akishin and Oleg Fedosov, 
who remains at large, as the alleged "triggermen." Notably, the six currently 
facing trial next month–Anatoli Voronin, Yuri Ionov, Akishin, Igor Lelyavin and 
Igor Krasnov–reportedly are members of the anything-but-pro-democracy Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia. Kolchin, reportedly was a former employee of 
Russian military intelligence (GRU) who worked for the so-called Tambov 
organized crime gang when the murder took place. (St. Petersburg Times, 9 Jan 
04; Johnson’s Russia List, #8007, 9 January 2004; and The Toronto Star, 13 Jan 
04, via Lexis-Nexis) 
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The case has dragged on for years, sparking rumors of a government cover-up. 
(Ibid) Suspicion as to possible high-level involvement remains. (The St. 
Petersburg Times, 19 Dec 03 via Lexis-Nexis) The latest move by prosecutors–
refusing to grant the defense’s request for a jury trial (Channel One TV, 1200 
GMT, 29 Dec 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis)–certainly gives weight to such 
accusations. Indeed, some have noted their surprise that anyone has been 
arrested. In the end, the FSB has charged the six defendants with "an act of 
terrorism or an attempt to kill a state or public official so that she would cease 
carrying out her state or other political activity." (The St. Petersburg Times, 19 
Dec 03; Lexis-Nexis) 
 
MEDIA 
Journalism’s no picnic either, apparently 
Reporters in Russia face lots of obstacles to doing their jobs — evaporating 
financial support, harassment at newspaper offices, reluctant sources. And, 
according to outgoing OSCE representative Freimut Duve, death. "In certain 
regions of Russia we have quite a high rate of censorship by killing, because if 
you kill a journalist who goes after corruption then you know that this journalist 
will be dead and quiet and other journalists will stop searching because they 
want to survive," Duve told Agence France-Presse. Moreover, such tactics 
appear to be working, Duve said: "So we have more silence now in the post-
Soviet world than we had five years ago." (AFP (North European Service) in 
English 1659 GMT 10 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1210 via World News 
Connection.) 
 
In his final report, Duve subsequently lambasted Russia, along with Italy, for 
moving backward on the road to press freedoms. "When I took the job in 1997 ... 
who would have thought that in the developing Russia, the Kremlin would again 
have direct or indirect control of many of the print media and most of the 
electronic media," he said in his report. "Who would have predicted that the just-
concluded Russian State Duma elections would be so widely criticised for failing 
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to meet international standards because of the lack of media independence?" 
(Paris AFP (North European Service) in English 1659 GMT 11 Dec 03; FBIS-
WEU-2003-1211 via World News Connection) 
 
The recent parliamentary elections did, indeed, provide the Russian media with 
numerous examples of government interference, from the above-mentioned 
control of state-owned media to obstructionism, particularly at the local level, 
towards regional outlets. Regional media complaints included confiscation of 
newspapers, interference in the production and distribution of papers, and 
intimidation of reporters, including interrogation of journalists and publishers. 
Prime targets were supporters of SPS and critics of United Russia. (FBIS Report 
in English 11 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1211 via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
By then maybe we’ll be flying to Mars… 
In a move designed to prevent future erosion of its struggling space program, at 
the start of the new year, Russia extended its lease of the Baikonaur 
Cosmodrome (at 45.5 deg N and 63.2 deg E) from Kazakhstan. While 
negotiations were not conducted in an adversarial atmosphere, neither was it an 
easy agreement to read. Russia wanted to add fifty years starting in 2014 when 
the current agreement (signed in 1994 in the aftermath of the breakup of the 
USSR) runs out. Kazakhstan didn’t want to commit to that long a lease, but 
because the Cosmodrome is a major source of income and jobs, it did want to 
secure a lease past 2014. In the end, both sides settled on a 36-year extension 
to 2050. The good news for Russia is that Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev so wanted to ensure the continuation of jobs and income derived from 
the agreement that the idea of raising the rent, set at $115 million a year in 1999, 
never even came up in negotiations. What the Kazakhs wanted, and obtained 
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from Russian President Vladimir Putin, was an agreement to clean up the former 
ICBM test area at Baikonaur and to develop more environmentally friendly 
rockets (Baitrek, a modified Angara launch vehicle), which together will help 
clean-up existing, and reduce future, pollution. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE Part I, 12 
January 2004; Gazeta, 12 Jan 04; What the Papers Say–Defense and Security, 
Vol. 2., 14 Jan 04 via Lexus-Nexus) 
 
Russia definitely is not placing all of it future space launch eggs in one basket, 
even if that basket is in the hands of a fairly friendly neighbor. Since the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, Russia has been developing, as funds allow, the former 
ICBM bases at Plesetsk (about 800 Km north of Moscow in the Archangel 
Region at 62.8 deg N and 40.3 deg E), and Svobodny (in the Far Eastern Amur-
Sakhalin region at 51.2 deg N and 128.8 deg E), into full-function space launch 
centers, giving her a quasi "bi-coastal" launch capability, much as the U.S. has in 
its two launch ranges in Florida and California. Plesetsk has launched "molniya" 
and other polar orbiting spacecraft since the 1960’s, while work started in 1996 to 
redevelop "Svobodny" craft for equatorial-inclined launches. 
(http://www.russianspaceweb.com/centers.html) It seems Russia will continue to 
develop both sites, with the idea of someday moving all of their launch activities 
to these Russian pads. In fact, the main (state-owned) Russian launch company 
is building a brand-new launch complex for its more environmentally friendly 
Angara family of launch vehicles at Plesetsk. Certainly, the lack of an increase in 
the Baikonaur rent gives Russia some flexibility to invest both in the Plesetsk and 
Svobodny launch complexes. (The Design Bureau web site, 
http://www.kbtm.ru/english/complexes/plesetsk.htm; Gazeta, 12 Jan 04; What the 
Papers Say–Defense and Security, Vol. 2., 14 Jan 04 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Even if Russia eventually does move all its launch activities into Russia itself, all 
is not lost for Kazakhstan. Not only will the entire complex at Baikonaur revert 
back to it at the end of the lease (or sooner), the new agreement allows for 
greater joint use. I suspect that while the Russians are busy getting ready to 
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move in a few decades, the Kazakhs will be preparing to take over and use what 
will one day be entirely theirs. 
 
The Caviar Bomber 
In another sign that the Russian military continues to have corruption and 
leadership problems, on 19 December 03 the Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB), together with Internal Affairs (MVD) police officers of Khabarovsk Kray, 
seized a very large (and illegally-poached) cache of red and black caviar and 
expensive sturgeon fish from the cargo bay of a Russian Air Force Tu-154 long-
range bomber (operating in its alter ego cargo/passenger role). According to 
Colonel Aleksandr Talalin of the Internal Affairs office, police confiscated 5.5 
metric tons of red caviar, 160 Kg of black caviar and half a ton of sturgeon from 
the bomber just before it was to fly from Khabarovsk to Moscow via Chita and 
Novosibirsk. The delicacies have a street value of more than 11 million RUR in 
Moscow. (IZVESTIYA, 26 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1229 via World News 
Connection) 
 
A Russian Air Force spokesman says that they have no idea how the contraband 
got aboard an Air Force plane, but regional Duma deputies and law enforcement 
organizations suspect the goodies were intended to grace the tables of many 
senior officers in Moscow for the New Year celebration. Police are working with 
the Khabarovsk Garrison Military Prosecutor’s office to determine if this profitable 
poaching and smuggling operation was a local effort or, as has been alleged by 
spouses of the junior officers, standard practice dictated by senior leaders in 
Moscow for their benefit. (IZVESTIYA, 26 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1229 via 
World News Connection) 
 
The latest allegations are contained in a letter that Izvestiya received from a 
group of officer’s wives at the State Aircraft Testing Center at Akhtubinsk, 
Astrakhan Oblast. The wives wrote, "An emissary from a general in Moscow, who 
comes to us…every year, settles up with the poachers [members of the former 
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Fishing Inspectorate and their families] …right next to the sturgeon pits. And 
Russian Army officers are forced to transport the sturgeon from where they were 
caught to the appointed place in their own cars -- on direct orders from the head 
of the unit HQ. One of the three duty officers is stood down and has to pick up 
the sturgeon in his own car. Any objections are construed as disobeying orders. 
If any officer is caught by the Fishing Inspectorate with such a load, he must say: 
'I caught all of this myself! I left my post of my own volition!' No one is interested 
in the young officer's fate: There he is with no pay, no apartment, and for having 
such a load in his car -- sturgeon and black caviar -- he can be put in prison. 
Save our husbands...." (IZVESTIYA, 26 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1229 via World 
News Connection) 
 
If true, the situation once again illustrates the "acceptable" level of corruption that 
is still rampant at even the very highest strata of military leadership. The "brass" 
continues to profit while the junior officers and troops not only don’t benefit from 
the "spoils" but they are set up to take the fall if something goes wrong. In the 
end, not only does morale suffer (because the troops see the leadership out for 
its own gains), but also training and operational expertise continues to decline 
when precious flying hours and aviation gas are used to further these illegal 
activities, instead of conducting routine training. 
 
The name’s Ivanov, Sergei Ivanov 
Is Sergei Ivanov, current Russian Minister of Defense and close friend of 
President Vladimir Putin, in line to get a new job? Many analysts in Russia 
believe he may become, in the near future, the Prime Minister, putatively the 
second most powerful job in the Russian Federation. The latest evidence is his 
recent visit to four Siberian regions from 12-15 January 04. Initial reports 
mentioned the usual dog and pony shows: getting a briefing from Colonel-
General Nikolai Makarov, commander of the Siberian military district, on the 
readiness of his combat units and visiting a Strategic Rocket Force unit…ho 
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hum… (FK-Novosti, 12 Jan 04; What the Papers Say–Defense and Security, Vol. 
2., 14 Jan 04 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
But other reports mention much more unusual goings on. During his visit he 
discussed with war veterans in Irkutsk ways to bring up young people more 
patriotically; emphasized to military officials in the Siberian Military District the 
importance of working with the public; briefed local media in Barnaul on the 
challenges and successes of the military; and in Omsk, met with civil and elected 
leaders of the regions making up the Siberian Federal District and discussed 
ways to improve cooperation between the military and local authorities. The 
agenda is strikingly political and far from the norm for a defense minister. 
Although Ivanov travels a lot, his itinerary is usually full of meetings with senior 
military officers of the military districts or fleets, visits to units and barracks, 
military planning or international treaty meetings, or, as he did in October 03, 
riding a Tu-160 bomber to observe a major exercise. But seldom does he meet 
with so many regional and local civic leaders. 
 
Senior Defense Ministry officials deny that this tour has anything to do with 
President Putin’s re-election campaign or a future promotion for Ivanov, but other 
sources in the Defense Ministry, while saying that the trip is not related to the 
presidential election, do admit that the trip has certain overtones, as Ivanov tries 
to obtain a clearer picture of, and discuss problems concerning, all strata of 
Russian society, not just the military niche. Ivanov himself has downplayed all the 
speculation. At a news conference on 9 January 04, he said, "When I was in the 
Security Council, and now that I'm with the Defense Ministry, I made a point to 
count all rumors concerning my transfers. There were 13 or 14 of them. You 
wouldn't believe some of the rumors I heard for myself…let them talk... I don't 
mind." The Minister specifically denied leaving the Ministry of Defense anytime 
soon, saying, "I'd like some tangible results here first. Something like 
implementing the transition of permanent combat readiness units to contract 
service." (Kommersant, 13 Jan 04; What the Papers Say–Defense and Security, 
 28 
Vol. 2., 14 Jan 04 via Lexis-Nexis) Interestingly, this effort, promoted at a major 
conference attended by President Putin in October 03, is expected to take until 
2007, leaving Ivanov available in 2008…for a well-deserved vacation…or 
perhaps a new job if Putin doesn’t end up stretching his presidency beyond its 
current legal limits. 
 
In any case, Ivanov’s recent successes in aggregating power in the Defense 
Ministry (control of arms exports, absorption of the Railroad troops, coordinator of 
the branches of Russia's security apparatus, etc.) make one thing clear: he’s a 
man whose name we all will come to know even better. (Kommersant, 13 Jan 04; 
What the Papers Say–Defense and Security, Vol. 2., 14 Jan 04 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept. of Defense or the 
United States government. 
 
NAVY 
On course within the Kerch Strait 
Addressing the territorial impasse that developed between Ukraine and Russia in 
October-November 2003, bilateral negotiations between Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Putin seem to have yielded 
consensus concerning the demarcation of sovereignty in and access to the Kerch 
Strait and the Sea of Azov. On the surface, the agreement signed between 
Ukraine and Russia on 24 December in the Crimean town of Kerch constitutes a 
step towards resolving a confrontation that, at one stage, threatened to 
precipitate hostilities. The more esoteric ramification of the agreement goes far 
beyond the issues of sovereignty and access. For Ukraine this means resolution 
of a border dispute that impeded Ukraine’s path to putative NATO membership. 
 
"The agreement defines the Sea of Azov as the internal waters of both Ukraine 
and Russia, and it provides for the free navigation of Ukrainian and Russian 
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military and civilian vessels in the area, while third-flag vessels need the consent 
of both Ukraine and Russia to operate within those waters." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE 
Vol. 7, No. 242, Part II, 30 December 2003) Removed from contention were 
proposals by both countries to demarcate state borders on the bottom and 
surface of the sea. As witnessed in the Northern Limit Line that territorially 
separates North Korea from South Korea on both coasts, sea demarcations 
constitute (an admittedly volatile) framework within which neighbors with 
potentially disparate interests may coexist. In the case of the Kerch Strait the 
assumption is that vast mineral resources lie beneath the strait and that access 
to the area can boost both countries' fishing industries. The Sea of Azov itself 
"will be divided into Ukrainian and Russian territorial waters based on the 
countries' coast lines. Ukrainian ownership of islands close to the Russian shore 
will give Ukraine a lion's share of any division of the waterway." (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 24 Dec 03 via Lexis-Nexis database) 
 
The agreement may enhance claims that the creation of a Single Economic 
Space between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan could provide a forum 
of cooperation, mutual understanding and economic prosperity. Time will tell if 
the Single Economic Space paradigm will prove viable considering the competing 
interests of the putative members. Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to 
the creation of the Single Economic Space as well to as the agreement regarding 
the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov in his New Year’s Day speech and in his 
message to Ukrainian President Kuchma that claimed cooperation between 
Russia and Ukraine, "will without doubt become an important factor in improving 
the well-being of the peoples of both states." (UNIAN news agency, Kiev, 31 Dec 
03; BBC Monitoring via What the Paper’s Say database) 
 
The agreement was lauded by Russian shipping magnates, who previously had 
to pay tolls to the Ukrainian government for transit through the constricted 
waterway that separates Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula from Russia’s Krasnodar 
province. In addition, tolls levied on third-party vessels transiting the Strait will be 
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divided equally between Ukraine and Russia. The military implications of the 
agreement were welcomed by Russia; "Battleships will be able to enter the Sea 
of Azov only by consent of both Russia and Ukraine. Thus, Kyiv won't be alone in 
sanctioning the voyage of battleships of third countries which are NATO member 
states, which was Russia's main fear." (Moskovsky Komsomolets, 26 Dec 03; 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis database) 
 
The disposition of the disputed Tuzla spit remains unresolved and was not 
addressed publicly in the agreement between Ukraine and Russia. 
 
K-159 heads to court 
Court proceedings are underway in Severomorsk in the criminal culpability trial of 
Admiral Gennadi Suchkov, one-time Commander of the Northern Fleet. A former 
bright star in the Russian Navy and thought to be destined for Russia's highest 
military position, Suchkov now faces up to 5 years in prison if found culpable of 
negligence in the sinking of submarine K-159 and the loss of nine sailors near 
the Kola gulf last August as the vessel was under tow to a Murmansk scrapping 
facility. 
 
Unresolved are the inconsistent reports concerning the factors at play in the 
incident as well as the timelines involved. Although shrouded in secrecy, awaiting 
the potential release of confidential material and procedures, initial reports of the 
case that have been released by the Chairman of the North Sea Navy Court, 
Major-General of Military Justice Aleksandr Khomyakov, state that "the criminal 
case consists of twenty-one volumes. There are eighty-five witnesses. Therefore, 
the court has a far from easy and long job ahead in order to get to the bottom of 
the disaster." (ITAR-TASS, 13 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0113 via World News 
Connection database) Charges were preferred against Admiral Suchkov and 
other Northern Fleet officials by a "group of investigators from the office of the 
main military prosecutor [who] said the tragedy was a result of negligence on the 
part of the officials who were subsequently brought to trial." (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 
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04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0112 via World News Connection) The trial is expected to 
take five weeks. 
 
The case is arousing renewed concerns on the disposition of the remaining 
nuclear submarines as well as calls to scrap them rapidly. To date, "of the 119 
nuclear-powered submarine that have been taken out of service from the 
Northern Fleet, 58 have been recycled. The rest are located at resting bases and 
present a major radiation hazard not only for the Kola peninsula, but also for 
northern regions of neighboring Norway," (ITAR-TASS, 09 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-
2004-0109 via World News Connection) stated the chairman of the Murmansk 
Oblast Duma, Pavel Sazhinov. 
 
Sazhinov is voicing a concern among many in Russia and around the globe with 
regard to the safety concerns posed by nuclear submarines inactive for decades. 
However, the defense budget is already unable to meet the demands placed 
upon it. Foreign assistance monies from the United States and Germany have 
been allocated already to expedite the deactivation and scrapping of submarines. 
 
Whatever the fiscal realities, Sazhinov considers "it extremely necessary to 
consider at government level the issue of why implementation of the state 
program to reduce radiation hazards, which is funded from the federal budget, is 
not running smoothly, and to adopt emergency measures to prevent tragedies 
similar to that of the K-159 from recurring." (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-
2004-0112 via World News Connection database). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Why are the Ukrainians silent? 
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In the wake of recent developments concerning Ukrainian political reform 
developments that violate the very notion of democracy, there has been very little 
visible reaction from those whose rights were disregarded–the people of Ukraine. 
To recapitulate these events: the Ukrainian parliament voted on the political 
reform draft law, which proposes that presidential elections by popular vote 
should be held in October 2004, but that the powers of the president elected 
would be terminated by the inauguration of a president chosen by parliament in 
2006. (MOSCOW ITAR-TASS, 23 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1223 via World 
News Connection) In addition, the Constitutional Court ruled that, since the 
current constitution was adopted after Kuchma had already started his first term 
in office, that term would not count against him should he decide to run for the 
third time in the 2004 presidential elections. 
 
Clearly, such developments are directed against the opposition, whose most 
likely presidential aspirant–the leader of Our Ukraine block, Victor Yushchenko,–
if elected in 2004, would be challenged again in 2006 through presidential 
elections held by the parliament. Other reasons for the proposal are to give 
Kuchma enough leverage to retain control of the pro-presidential parliamentary 
majority, which is about to fall apart (even though it is unlikely that Kuchma will 
actually run for the third term, since his popularity rating is extremely low, as he 
undoubtedly realizes). 
 
Considering the arbitrary rulings of the Constitutional Court and the politicians' 
disgraceful conduct in the parliament, one cannot help but wonder: Why are the 
Ukrainians silent? Why are the people not responding to the calls of the 
opposition to rise up and try to protect their basic right to elect a president? 
 
A traditional answer might be the known passivity and incredible patience of 
those who went through the communist system of conformity and inertia. That 
may be. Another reason is more likely however: The current government might 
be bad, but the opposition is perceived as being no better. The opposition has 
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been extremely weak in Ukraine. The failure of the opposition parties to unite 
behind a single opposition candidate is an indication of that weakness. The 
leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) Petro Symonenko in an 
interview that has been published on the Ukrainskaya pravda web site said that 
"a single opposition candidate in the upcoming presidential elections was an 
utopian dream…[the CPU] and the other leading opposition movement, Out 
Ukraine, had irreconcilable ideological differences. The only thing the four 
opposition parties could agree on was to fight tirelessly for a free and fair 
election." (UKRAINSKAYA PRAVDA web site, 14 Nov 03; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
It seems that no opposition leader is willing to associate with any other. 
Yushchenko is afraid that Yulia Timoshenko's "oligarch" history will rub off on 
him, and the hard-liner Communist Symonenko is no favorite of other opposition 
leaders. This inability to find common ground and to unite has resulted in the 
population's opinion of the opposition. Taras Kuzio in his article, "Why is the 
Opposition Weak in Ukraine?", summarizes some significant statistics. A June 
poll by Democratic Initiatives revealed that 57.5 percent of the Ukrainian 
population trusted neither NGOs nor political parties; an Interfax poll found out 
that 69.2 percent of the Ukrainians are unwilling to take part in opposition 
protests; according to the poll cited by Ukrainskaya Pravda on August 18, 32 
percent will never vote for Yushchenko–the most popular, pro-Western Ukrainian 
politician. (RFE/RL, 9 Dec 03, Vol. 5, No.46) The reason is that 40 percent of 
Ukrainians (mostly in Eastern Ukraine) are ethnic Russians or Russian speakers 
and tend to favor integration with Russia. Yushchenko's largely pro-Western 
politics are disliked in that part of the country. 
 
Recent activities in the parliament showed that the unwillingness of the 
population to support the opposition (as well as the authorities) is 
understandable. The antics of parliamentary deputies late in December evoked 
both ridicule and disappointment: The minority MPs threw paper airplanes at the 
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speaker, broke the electronic voting system, and at the end were unable to 
accept defeat gracefully. The authorities were no better. They were guilty of dirty 
machinations to ensure their own well-being when forgoing the well-being of 
millions of fellow countrymen who elected them. 
 
There is general apathy in Ukraine about the population's ability to change the 
situation. A Ukrainian friend of mine revealed her despair to me: "Nothing 
depends on us. The election results are falsified at all levels. There is big money 
involved in the politics, therefore it is impossible to trust anyone. We are being 
deceived every time and no politician takes responsibility for his or her actions." 
 
So why are the Ukrainians silent? They have no one worthy to be loud for. 
 
BELARUS 
In 2004, parliamentary elections are due in Belarus. Each side is preparing for 
the elections in its own way. The opposition is creating new blocs and appealing 
to Europe for support, while the authorities are closing down and shutting up 
anyone who can stand in their way to parliamentary victory. The closure of nearly 
a dozen non-governmental organizations in 2003 was, most likely, politically 
motivated. 
 
Many doubt that the elections would be free and fair. Lukashenko, who has won 
past presidential elections by falsifying the results, finds virtually nothing to stop 
his associates from taking parliamentary seats for their own people. The 
leadership of the Conservative Christian Party (CCP) of the Belarusian People's 
Front believes that "the authorities will ensure victory for themselves at any 
elections or referenda, irrespective of voting…The only possibility for preventing 
the authorities from using elections in their interests is not to vote, this means an 
intentional total boycott." (MINSK BELAPAN, 12 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0112 
via World News Connection) The Front is planning to organize the boycott of 
 35 
illegitimate elections, with democratic presidential elections under an 
international protectorate to follow. 
 
Some think there is still hope, however. The beginning of the year was marked 
by the creation of the Young Belarus bloc of candidates for participation in the 
2004 elections to the National Assembly's House of Representatives. Around 30 
members have already joined the bloc including deputies of local governments, 
representatives of business and ecology movements and some unregistered 
organizations. (MINSK BELAPAN, 12 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2004-0112 via World 
News Connection) According to the bloc founders, Young Belarus is not a 
challenge to existing blocs and parties, as it is not nearly strong enough to 
compete with them, but it is rather a manifestation of society's discontent with the 
present government. 
 
In order to assure minimally fair elections, the European institutions are planning 
to monitor the political situation in Belarus during this year. The representatives 
of the European "parliamentary troika" (the Council of Europe, OSCE 
Parliamentary Assemblies and the European Parliament) are scheduled to visit 
Belarus in January 2004. This might leave Lukashenko a little less room for 
maneuver. And what can really hurt Lukashenko's support is the recent talk 
about his being involved in the disappearance of several political figures. 
Christos Purgudes, an OSCE special reporter, who has been conducting an 
extensive investigation in Minsk about missing political figures in Belarus is 
preparing to make his findings public at the January session of the OSCE. While 
the report is not ready yet, some quotations have appeared already. Novaya 
gazeta published some excerpts from that report: "The Belarusian authorities 
have not conducted an independent investigation of the missing cases…on the 
contrary, an active campaign has been conducted at the top levels of the 
government in order to conceal the true nature of these cases. I suspect that 
government officials might be involved in disappearance of these political 
figures." (NOVAYA GAZETA, 12 Jan 03) 
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The European observers better get to Minsk fast, since you never know who else 
may disappear before the 2004 elections. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
GEORGIA 
Thus far, a spirit of conciliation has permeated the tone and tactics of Nino 
Burjanadze’s interim government vis-à-vis Russia and Georgia's rebellious 
republics of South Ossetia, Adjaria and Abkhazia. However, with the 4 January 
presidential election victory of Mikhail Saakashvili, the Georgian government’s 
position is likely to give way to renewed confrontation, since its domestic and 
foreign initiatives will follow President-elect Saakashvili’s policy goals of 
Georgia's territorial restoration. Saakashvili’s determination to reassert Georgian 
control over the country’s recalcitrant autonomous republics of South Ossetia, 
Adjaria and Abkhazia will encounter the opposition of governments and their de 
facto protector--Moscow. The Autonomous Republic of Adjaria will provide the 
first proving ground for Saakashvili's policies. Additionally, it will demonstrate the 
reinvigorated US interest in Georgia and show how this dynamic relationship will 
alter the power balance in the Caucasus. 
 
Before Georgia’s tumultuous November parliamentary election, Saakashvili’s 
dealings with Adjarian political leader Aslan Abashidze were marked by 
antagonism. In December, after Saakashvili led popular protests that culminated 
in former president Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation, the mutually hostile 
language gave way to an interlude of conciliatory rhetoric. Before the Georgian 
presidential election, Saakashvili indicated that Abashidze could play "an 
important role" in Georgia’s political life. (ITAR-TASS, 2 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring; 
ISI Emerging Databases) Meanwhile, Abashidze did not follow through on threats 
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that Adjaria would boycott the January 4 presidential election, won by Saakashvili 
(ITAR-TASS, 3 Dec 04; www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=310389 ), 
and as recently as January 9, Abashidze said he was ready to "cooperate 
actively" with Tbilisi, describing Adjaria as "an integral part of Georgia" (ITAR-
TASS, 10 Jan 04; ISI Emerging Databases). 
 
However, mutual suspicion remained beneath the veneer of compromise -- a fact 
underscored by the decision of Adjarian officials to arrest two student activists on 
January 7. The activists — members of the Kmara student organization, which 
played a high-profile role in the Tbilisi protests in early November — were taken 
into custody on January 6 in the Adjarian capital of Batumi on charges of 
possessing weapons and seditious pamphlets. (Rustavi-2 TV Tbilisi, 7 Jan, 04; 
via BBC Monitoring; via ISI Emerging Databases) 
 
The incident threatened to put Georgian-Adjarian relations back on a hostile 
footing. Interim Georgian government leaders denounced the Adjarian arrests, 
along with Abashidze’s decision to re-impose a state of emergency in Batumi. 
"The days when human rights activists and people merely holding different views 
can be arrested [arbitrarily] should be over," said Zurab Zhvania, the interim 
government leader who is slated to become prime minister in Saakashvili’s 
administration. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Jan 04; via BBC Monitoring; via Lexis-Nexis) 
Currently though, Georgia’s interim government is seeking resolution through the 
democratic process, by providing support for an anti-Abashidze political initiative 
in Adjaria. The movement Our Adjaria was created in Tbilisi by the Adjarian 
intellectuals and politicians who seek to liberalize Abashidze’s authoritarian 
system in the region through parliamentary elections. 
(www.eurasianet.org/departments/articles/eav011204; 12 Jan 04) 
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More importantly though, Abashidze’s opposition prompted US efforts to resolve 
the situation in Tbilisi’s favor, thus leading to the Adjarian leader's abrupt 
departure to Moscow on 14 Jan (Rustavi-2 TV, 14 Jan 04; via BBC Monitoring) 
for the ostensible reason of "discussing possibilities for strengthening trade and 
economic relations with Russia," as stated by the official representative of the 
Adjarian Autonomous Republic in the Russian Federation Bagri Meladze (ITAR-
TASS, 15 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring; via ISI Emerging Databases). Prior to 
Abashidze’s leaving, both U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles and 
Deputy Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe visited Adjaria, followed by U.S. NATO 
Committee Chairman Bruce Jackson. It was after meeting with Jackson, that 
Abashidze left Batumi for Moscow. (Rustavi-2 TV, 14 Jan 04; via BBC 
Monitoring) Soon after his meeting with Abashidze, Jackson stated "The present 
situation in Georgia is that democratic institutions and civil society as a whole are 
in the process of formation. The steps which are being made are meant to 
promote the process. They are significant for Georgia and the United States." 
Time will tell how Moscow will react to the enhanced U.S. relationship with 
Georgia. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Recent relations between Grozny and Moscow indicate that the Russian 
administration is divided on its Chechen policy, specifically on whether or not to 
support the increasingly autonomous Kadyrov regime. 
 
Throughout November and December of 2003, Akhmad Kadyrov worked to 
consolidate his control over the Chechen government apparatus, and to place all 
administrative mechanisms into the hands of his loyal appointees. To give 
himself additional power, Kadyrov also repeatedly requested Moscow to draft a 
new treaty which would redefine Chechnya's administrative relations with the 
federal center and increase Grozny's control over federal subsidies. Moscow, 
though, has moved slowly in this matter, indicating the administration’s hesitancy 
to give Kadyrov control over the projected one billion dollars to be allotted to 
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Chechnya in the coming year. (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 Dec 03; What the 
Papers Say via ISI Emerging Databases; ITAR-TASS, 7 Dec, 03: BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
However, though some in Moscow may be unwilling to give Kadyrov total fiscal 
control of Chechnya, Kadyrov has his allies in the Kremlin as demonstrated by 
the announcement on 12 January that Anatoli Popov, Chechnya’s Prime 
Minister, would not be returning to the republic. (Interfax, 12 Jan 04 via ISI 
Emerging Databases; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 Jan 04; What the Papers Say via 
Lexis-Nexis) Popov was the only remaining federal representative holding an 
important position within the Kadyrov administration. Popov’s expected 
replacement is acting Prime Minister Eli Isayev, who is governing Chechnya 
during Kadyrov's trip to Riyadh from 14 Jan to 18 Jan (ITAR-TASS, 14 Jan 04; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-0114, via World News Connection), and is personally 
dependent on Kadyrov for his appointment. 
 
Moscow’s ambiguous Chechen policy and Kadyrov’s ability to curry favor and 
manipulate the divided administration indicate both Chechnya’s volatility and 
Putin’s fear of a misstep. Putin’s fear of the Chechen situation is derived partially 
from the realization that Kadyrov is unable to control or calm the republic, 
because Putin, by spearheading Kadyrov into power in Chechnya, has created a 
tyrannical, ineffectual government. Kadyrov does not hold the loyalty of the 
Chechen people or of the various Russian military contingents stationed in the 
republic. However, a key question to ask is whether Putin’s fear is generated 
partially by his knowledge that Moscow no longer controls the loyalties of some 
of the Russian military forces in Chechnya. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
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Closer relations and a note on Religion & Security 
The New Year brought steps aimed at forging closer relationships between 
Russia and Kazakhstan as well as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. As is often the 
case in Central Asia, gestures of warming ties were marked by talks of delimiting 
common borders and the expressed desire to cooperate in combating common 
security threats. Terrorism and religious extremism constitute issues around 
which the countries of Central Asia can voice agreement. 
 
Kazakh-Russian Relations 
In terms of meetings and productivity, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s early 
January visit to Kazakhstan resulted in an array of investment plans and 
cooperative agreements. Setting the tone of the meetings between Putin and 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, was the January 9, 2004, signing of an 
agreement of cooperation to delimit the 7500km Kazakh-Russian border by the 
end of 2004. While relations between Kazakhstan and Russia have been 
amiable, post-Soviet independence created a situation wherein sections of 
Russian railway lines cross into Kazakh territory and Kazakh railway lines cross 
into Russian territory. The agreement to delimit the borders goes on to define the 
extent of border cooperation on migration, trafficking and security issues. (ITAR-
TASS, 0529 GMT, 12 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0112; 2104 GMT, 9 Jan 04; FBIS-
SOV-2004-0109 via World News Connection) 
 
While the meetings between the two presidents were lauded in part for boundary 
cooperation, economic cooperation seemed more to constitute the motive. Putin 
expressed his desire that "in a relatively short term, the volume of trade and 
economic cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan" would at least double. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1917 GMT, 9 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0109 via World News 
Connection) Thirty-eight percent of goods imported to Kazakhstan come from 
Russia, whereas trade in the other direction accounts for 15 percent of 
Kazakhstan’s exports. Given a current $5.5 billion relationship, Nazarbaev 
advocated the uniformity of transportation tariffs to help double bilateral trade to 
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$10 billion annually. (ITAR-TASS, 2235 GMT, 9 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0109, 
via World News Connection) 
 
The largest area of interest for the two countries, of course, is the energy sector. 
According to Yuri Shafranik, head of the Russian Oil and Gas Union, Kazakh 
"fuel exports have increased fivefold [in the last ten years and] exceeded 50 
million tones in 2003." Seeing Russia as lagging in acknowledging the energy 
potential of Kazakhstan, Shafranik went on to advocate an annual Russian 
investment of $1 billion in the Kazakh energy industry. (ITAR-TASS, 1330 GMT, 
9 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0109 via World News Connection) LUKoil and 
KazMunaiGaz announced plans to cooperate in developing the Tyub-Karagan 
and Atashskaya deposits in the Caspian region of Kazakhstan, and with 
additional pipelines to a Baltic port, to help Kazakhstan reach its oil export goal of 
100 million tons after 2010. (ITAR-TASS, 1835 GMT; 1710 GMT, 9 Jan 04; FBIS-
SOV-2004-0109 via World News Connection) 
 
Tajik-Uzbek Relations 
The talks between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which took place at the end of 
December, had a less grandiose economic agenda but did touch on the efficient 
use of energy and water resources. The thrust of talks between Tajik Prime 
Minister Akil Akilov and Uzbek President Islam Karimov centered on issues of 
cross-border security and improving the relationship between the two neighbors. 
The meetings were broad in scope — discussing economic, political, and cultural 
relations — but can be seen as an initial step towards greater cooperation in 
meeting both the economic and security needs of the two countries. (ITAR-
TASS, 1529 GMT, 29 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1229 via World News 
Connection) 
 
As a sign of desire to improve relations, Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov 
said that the demarcation of the final 180km of the 2000km Tajik-Uzbek border 
should be finished and agreed upon by April 2004. (ITAR-TASS, 1235 GMT, 29 
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Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1229, via World News Connection) Nazarov also added 
that he and Sadyk Safayve, his Uzbek counterpart, were discussing the 
possibility of abolishing visa requirements for trips between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, emphasizing that "it is in the interests of our two countries and our 
peoples to continue that work." (ITAR-TASS, 1145 GMT, 29 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-1229, via World News Connection) 
 
Note on Religion & Security 
Security is one of the driving forces behind the desire to improve Tajik-Uzbek 
relations. As the countries of the region come together to meet the threats of 
terrorism, religious extremism, and drug trafficking, new working relationships are 
being forged and old ones revived. As noted earlier, Central Asia is a region 
threatened by the potential of Islamic extremism. Two more activists of the 
banned group Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) were detained in Shahr-i Nav and Khujand for 
distributing "Wahhabi literature", bringing the number of HT members detained in 
Tajikistan to over 70 during 2003. (ITAR-TASS, 0502 GMT, 28 Dec 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1228 via World News Connection) In what was seen by some as a 
political move, Shamsuddin Shamsuddinov, leader of Tajikistan’s Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP), was sentenced to 16 years in prison for "organizing a 
criminal group, illegally crossing the border, and polygamy;" charges which 
Shamsuddinov denies. (RFE/RL, 13 Jan 04, via www.rferl.org) (The IRP was part 
of the Tajik government’s main opposition during the civil war and the 1997 
peace agreement afforded it recognition, which in turn made the IRP Central 
Asia’s only officially registered Islamic political party.) 
 
The governments of Central Asia react quickly to the threat of religious 
extremism and its potential manifestation in terrorism. This, of course, has 
opened up the region for improved cooperation at the governmental level and 
reawakened old relationships. Thus, while Russian Lt-Gen. Aleksandr Manilov of 
the FSB Federal Border Guard Service supports the gradual transfer of sections 
of the Tajik-Afghan border to Tajik border guards, he made clear that there are 
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no plans for "any withdrawal of the Russian border directorate from Tajikistan." 
(ITAR-TASS, 0933 GMT, 11 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0111 via World News 
Connection) Russia’s support (and hegemony) is not without reward. Nazarov 
said that Russia and Tajikistan would remain "strategic partners for years to 
come" (ITAR-TASS, 1612 GMT, 24 Dec 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1224 via World 
News Connection) and confirmed that "a Russian military base must exist in Tajik 
territory, and no one is going back on this." (ITAR-TASS, 1533 GMT, 24 Dec 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1224 via World News Connection) 
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